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EU Court of Justice delivers preliminary ruling in Belgian Parody Case (Spike and Suzy) 
CJEU broadens the concept of parody, and  returns the hot potatoes to the national court 
By Dirk Voorhoof (Ghent University) and Inger Høedt-Rasmussen (Copenhagen University) 
                                           (5,5 by 8,5 cm) 
A pending case in Belgium on parody evokes a set of questions related to the right to freedom of 
expression conflicting with copyright, and the impact of the Information Society (Infosoc) Directive 
2001/29, such as e.g. the question whether the parody exception must be given an autonomous and 
uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, despite the optional nature of the parody 
exception mentioned in Article 5(3)(k) of the Directive 2001/29. The most interesting aspects of the 
case deal with the criteria of the parody and the remaining possibilities of the right holders in case 
they don’t want  the original work to be  associated with a parody, when that parody contains an 
(alleged) message of discrimination or “hate speech”. In this blog we briefly focus on the definition 
by the CJEU of the parody concept and on the aspect of the conflicting rights at issue: copyright vs. 
freedom of expression. 
The parody at issue is a transformative use of one of the most famous comics strips in Belgium, Spike 
and Suzy (Suske en Wiske, Bob et Bobette) by Willy Vandersteen. The parodist is the Vlaams Belang 
(Flemish Interest), a Flemish nationalistic party, rejecting multiculturalism, advocating the 
independence of the Flemish region and limiting immigration. The Vlaams Belang originated from 
Vlaams Blok, after a criminal conviction in 2004 finding that the party’s publications had manifestly 
and systematically incited to racism and xenophobia. The right holders on the work of Vandersteen 
request for an interim injunction, while Vlaams Belang (in the case represented by Deckmyn and 
Vrijheidsfonds) relies on the parody exception in the Belgian Copyright Act (Art. 22(1), 6°) and its 
freedom of political speech.  
Copyright and free speech as conflicting rights 
The case concerns more particularly a small calendar, less than 6 by 9 centimeters, distributed in 
January 2011 by the Vlaams Belang, representing one of the Spike and Suzy comic book’s main 
characters, Ambrose (Lambik), wearing a white tunic and throwing coins to people who are trying to 
pick them up. The calendar resembles the cover of an original Spike and Suzy album, “De Wilde 
Weldoener”, roughly to be translated as “The Compulsive Benefactor”. On the cover of the calendar 
the character of Ambrose is replaced by the Mayor of the City of Ghent. The people picking up the 
coins are replaced by people wearing veils and people of colour. The President of the Court of First 
Instance in Brussels had rejected the parody defense by the Vlaams Belang, in essence because of 
lack of originality and because the parody did not criticize the work of Willy Vandersteen, but 
targeted the policy by the Mayor of the city of Ghent. It granted an interim injunction to prevent 
further distribution of the calendar because of copyright infringement. The decision was appealed. 
The Court of Appeal in Brussels showed reluctance how to decide the case and asked for a 
preliminary ruling by the CJEU in order to give some guidance how to apply the parody exception in 
the framework of EU copyright law. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the CJEU draws the attention on the conflicting rights at issue,  
considering that “the application, in a particular case, of the exception for parody, within the 
meaning of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, 
the interests and rights of persons referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of that directive (reproduction right 
and right of communication to the public, DV and IHR), and, on the other, the freedom of expression 
of the user of a protected work who is relying on the exception for parody, within the meaning of 
Article 5(3)(k)”. This approach of balancing copyright with the right to freedom of expression can also 
be found in the recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights (see our blogs on the Ashby 
Donald and “The Pirate Bay” case: D. Voorhoof and I. Høedt-Rasmussen, “Copyright vs. Freedom of 
Expression”, and “Copyright vs. Freedom of Expression II (The Pirate Bay)” (links).  
Broad concept of parody can limit copyright claims in cases of “transformative use” of copyright 
protected works 
The judgment of the CJEU of 3 September 2014 opts unambiguously for a broad, even a very broad 
definition of what can consist a parody and hence extends the range and application of the parody 
exception. Indeed in some EU member states, and especially in Belgium, the parody concept was 
given a much narrower interpretation as compared to the new established European standard.  The 
CJEU decides that  “the essential characteristics of parody are, first, to evoke an existing work while 
being noticeably different from it, and, secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or mockery”. 
These are actually the only two relevant and pertinent characteristics, as all other criteria or 
conditions formulated by the Brussels Court of Appeal in its request for a preliminary ruling are 
irrelevant, according to the CJEU. The CJEU is very decisive and clear : “The concept of ‘parody’ (..) , is 
not subject to the conditions that the parody should display an original character of its own, other 
than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied work; that it could 
reasonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself; that it should 
relate to the original work itself or mention the source of the parodied work”. This also implies that 
both the parody ‘on’ and the parody ‘with’ are covered by the EU parody exception: a parody does 
not need to criticize or be directly in contrast or in a dialogue with the original work, as it does not 
need “to relate to the original work itself”.  
The CJEU clearly chooses for a wide and flexible parody concept, emphasizing that the concept of 
parody must be broad enough to “enable the effectiveness” of that exception and to safeguard its 
purpose. The CJEU considers that it “is not disputed that parody is an appropriate way to express an 
opinion”, and that the envisaged EU-harmonisation of copyright right and related rights in the 
information society, can only be reached in “observance of the fundamental principles of law and 
especially of property, including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and the public 
interest.” 
Therefore it is necessary and also sufficient that a parody “evokes” an existing work being 
“noticeably different” from it and that it constitutes an expression of “humour or mockery”. It means 
that the national judges in the EU-Member states can only apply these criteria in determining 
whether or not the parody-exception as mentioned  in Article 5(3)(k) of the Infosoc Directive 
2001/29, and implemented in their national law, can be invoked. Whether the parody is “noticeably 
different” and contains “humour or mockery” is to be decided within the discretionary power of the 
national courts. The interpretation whether a parody expresses “humour or mockery” should  be 
approached with due care, the courts or judges in this context becoming the jury of what humour or 
mockery is (and is not). For sure, there is no autonomous concept of EU law what humour or 
mockery is, while the “humour or mockery”-criteria are ultimately and decisively the criteria to 
determine whether a parody fits in the autonomous concept of parody in EU law. The appreciation 
whether something is considered as humour or mockery is very contextually determined and will be 
differently perceived according to age, gender, religion, nationality, ideology, social or cultural 
background etc. Apart from that, there are at least fifty shades of humour and mockery, which 
further complicates the application of these criteria in a legal setting. 
Copyright holders can still oppose against a parody, if the parody contains a discriminatory 
message they do not want to be associated with 
Even if the Vlaams Blok calendar is to be considered as a parody, according to the CJEU  the right 
holders still have, in principle, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the work protected by copyright 
is not associated with a discriminatory message. The result of this approach however risks to 
compromise the “fair balance” between the rights of the copyright holders and the right to freedom 
of artistic or political expression by the users of the copyright protected work. The CJEU explicitly 
refers to the EU instruments that can eventually justify an interference with the right to freedom of 
expression on the basis of combatting discrimination (the Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 
2000 and Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), but it does not  
refer to Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or Article 10 ECHR in this context. 
By leaving wide open the possibility for right holders to oppose against a parody they dislike to be 
associated with, because of its alleged discriminatory message, the approach of the CJEU  risks to 
compromise the aim and ratio of the parody exception. The essence of the parody exception is 
precisely to legitimise a transformative use of an original work without permission of the right 
holder, as copyright holders are not expected to authorise spontaneously the transformative use of 
their original work. If copyright holders can oppose the making of transformative works they do not 
want to be associated with, not much will be left of the parody exception. The circumstance that 
right holders have, in principle, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the work protected by copyright 
is not associated with a discriminatory message, does not mean that this is a sufficiently pertinent 
argument  to put aside the parody exception and to interfere with the freedom of political expression 
of the parodist. 
It is now up to the national courts, and if need be the European Court of Human Rights in a later 
stage, to determine whether the application of the copyright claim in this case, clearly interfering 
with the right to freedom of expression an information, can be sufficiently justified as necessary in a 
democratic society. Although the ECtHR has over the years established a very high level of  freedom 
of political speech, the circumstance that this case concerns the balancing of conflicting human rights 
and because the parody allegedly contains a discriminatory message or a form of “hate speech”, 
makes that the final outcome is hard to predict. 
Most important is that the CJEU has clarified that the parody exception is to be applied as a very 
broad concept in European law. This  obliges the judicial authorities of the EU member states to 
interpret the parody exception accordingly, that is in as far as it is provided in their national copyright 
legislation. EU member states who have not integrated a parody exception yet in their copyright law 
will now be inclined to do so. This aspect also reveals that many of the restrictions and limitations 
provided for in Article 5 of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29 should not be facultative, but mandatory, in 
order to guarantee a fair balance between copyright enforcement and the right to freedom of 
expression and information. And still a “fair balance” might be a balance that can be found outside 
the court room in a broader setting than the one provided by a legal framework. 
